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Bioterrorism Meets Privacy: An Analysis of
the Model State Emergency Health Powers
Act and the HIPAA Privacy Rule
Julie Bruce
INTRODUCTION

Every state has acknowledged power to pass[,] and enforce,
health and inspection law[s], to prevent the introduction of

disease, pestilence, or unwholesome provisions; such law[s] interfere with no powers of Congress or treaty stipulations; they

relate to internal police[,] and are subjects of domestic regulation within each state, over which no authority can be exercised by any power under the Constitution...'

In April 2000, the Centers for Disease Control (hereinafter
"CDC") published "Biological and Chemical Terrorism: Strategic Plan for Preparedness and Response."' 2 In its report, the
CDC concluded, "terrorist incidents in the United States and
elsewhere involving bacterial pathogens, nerve gas and lethal
plant toxins have demonstrated that the United States is vulnerable to biological and chemical threats." 3 As the CDC predicted
less than two years ago, bioterrorism is no longer something
Americans can discuss in the future tense. After the terrifying
events of September 11, 2001 and the anthrax attack that followed, citizens of the United States of America realize that bioterrorism is no longer just a looming threat, but rather a new
reality.
1. Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. 540, 616 (1840). In this case, George Holmes, the
petitioner, appealed the Supreme Court of Vermont's remand of his writ of habeas
corpus. The Supreme Court took this case on a writ of error. The Supreme Court
found the issues presented to be questions that, under § 25 of the Judiciary Act of
1789, were left to the states to decide. Therefore, the Supreme Court dismissed the
writ of error for lack of jurisdiction. In its decision, the Supreme Court discussed the
powers granted to the state and national governments, stating that "the states may
severally act upon [a] subject until the national government shall have acted." Id. at
551. The states cannot act "where there is a grant of power to the national government exclusive in its terms." Id. at 549.
2. Biological and Chemical Terrorism: Strategic Plan for Preparedness and Response, MORBIDITY AND MORALITY WEEKLY REPORT (CDC, Atlanta, GA), Apr. 21,
2000, available at http://www.bt.cdc.gov/Documents/BTStratPlan.pdf.
3. Id.
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The United States government has also recognized this.4 In a
statement late last year regarding bioterrorism, the Secretary of
the Department of Health and Human Services, Tommy
Thompson, said, "We need not only a strong health infrastructure and a full stockpile of medical resources, but also
the legal
5
and emergency tools to help our citizens quickly."
Part of the response to the challenge of creating an environment that can quickly respond to a public health emergency is
the Model State Emergency Health Powers Act (hereinafter
"MSEHPA").6 The MSEHPA was written by the CDC in conjunction with the Center for Law and the Public's Health at
Georgetown University and Johns Hopkins University. It is intended to serve as a basis for further collaboration with other
interested parties, including the National Governors Association, the National Conference of State Legislatures, the National Association of Attorneys General, the Association of
State and Territorial Health Officials, and the National Association of City and County Health Officers. The MSEHPA is intended to create a "renewed focus on the prevention, detection,
'7
management, and containment of public health emergencies."
In efforts to create a framework for states to work within during a public health emergency, the MSEHPA has taken strong
blows of criticism from individuals and groups who oppose the
Act's "sweeping powers" that some feel are "draconian, "8 and
reminiscent of "the old Soviet model of public health-lots of
power and no standards for applying it."9 The provisions of the
4. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., HHS Announces $1.1 Billion in Funding to
States for Bioterrorism Preparedness, HHS NEWS, Jan. 31, 2002, available at http://
www.hhs.gov/news/press/2002press/200201316.html. Tommy Thompson, Secretary of
the Department of Health and Human Services, announced a plan to distribute funds
to the states in order to ensure that the states can "building strong public health systems for responding to bioterrorism attack[s]" and to illustrate that the federal government is "do[ing] everything [it] can to ensure that America's ability to deal with
bioterrorism is as strong as possible." Id.
5. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., Statement by HHS Secretary Tommy G.
Thompson Regarding the Model State Emergency Health Powers Act, HHS NEWS,
Oct. 30, 2001, available at: www.hhs.gov/news/press/2001pres/20011030.html.
6. THE MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS ACT, (Proposed
Official Draft Dec. 21, 2001), available at http:// www.publichealthlaw.net.
7. THE MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS ACT PREAMBLE (Proposed Official Draft Dec. 21, 2001), available at http://www.publichealth
law.net.
8. Jon Dougherty, Bill Would Give Governors Absolute Power, WORLD NET
DAILY, Jan. 2002, available at http://www.vaccinationnews.com.
9. Marcia Coyle, States Urged to Update Antiquated Public Health Laws, Nat'l L.
J., Nov. 2, 2001, availableat http://www.law.com.
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MSEHPA instill broad emergency powers in the states.' This is
part of the effort to facilitate the early detection of health emergencies, and the advanced preparation of comprehensive plans
to provide a coordinated response to the health emergency. As
written, the MSEHPA grants the governor of the state enormous power,1" including the "ability to arrest, transport, quarantine, drug and vaccinate anyone suspected of carrying a
potentially infectious disease. ' 12 It is this vast inclusion of future scenarios coupled with the concentration of power created
by the MSEHPA that has generated criticism and hesitation
from so many individuals.
In sharp contrast to the MSEHPA is the Privacy Rule of the
Health Information Portability and Accountability Act of 1996
(hereinafter "HIPAA"). 3 HIPAA was promulgated in part to
protect the private health information of Americans. in Privacy
is one of the bedrock principles in federal and state constitutional law.1 5 Where HIPAA attempts to create a system of
padlocks on protected health information (hereinafter "PHI"),
the MSEHPA creates a system of disclose now, obtain consent
later. Under certain circumstances, the MSEHPA gives designated officials liberal access to PHI without the obligation of
adhering to privacy regulations until after they have obtained,
utilized, and possibly even released PHI.
10. Id.
11. Thomas W. Washburne, Review of the Model State Emergency Health Powers
Act, Nat'l Ctr. for Home Educ., available at http:// www.hslda.org/docs/nche/000010/
200112201.asp.
12. News Release, Tetrahedron LLC, CDC Advances Totalitarian Legislation
Under Guise of "Public Health": Forced Drugging and Injections are on the Horizon,
Nov. 9, 2001, available at http:/ www.tetrahedron.org/news/NR011109.html.
13. Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65 Fed.
Reg. 82,462 (Dec. 28, 2000) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160 and 164).
14. The Office for Civil Rights, Standardsfor Privacy of Individually Identifiable
Health Information, available at http://www.aspe.hhs.gov/admnsimp/final/pvcguidel.
htm. The HIPAA privacy rule "provides the first comprehensive federal protection
for the privacy of health information." Id.
15. Peter Olson, Pickup Basketball, 16 CONST. COMMENT. 39 (Spring 1999).
The First Amendment, in every of its terms, stands on the foundational principle that there is a penumbra or zone of privacy surrounding everyone entitled to its protection against governmental intrusion. Beyond the First
Amendment's right of assembly, for example, there is the Third Amendment's prohibition against the quartering of soldiers, the Fourth Amendment's right to be free from unreasonable searches, and the Fifth
Amendment's right against self-incrimination. A citizen's right to privacy is
much older than the Bill of Rights, and is unquestionably embodied in it. To
argue otherwise is to exalt semantics over substance.
Id. at 44.
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The reality of bioterrorism and the need for a rapid response
plan when there is an attack, in conjunction with strong demands for privacy of PHI, has created a very perplexing problem. This article will focus on the current struggle in society that
is reflected through the MSEHPA and HIPAA: the need to be
prepared for and defend against a bioterror attack, and the desire to maintain very important Constitutional liberties. This article will argue that these two seemingly contradictory ideals can
co-exist, although with modifications. Part I begins by outlining
the MSEHPA, as well as the applicable provisions of HIPAA.
In Part II, the MSEHPA and the HIPAA provisions will be analyzed in light of their relation to historical public health law
holdings, illustrating that the powers granted by these two laws
are not new, but rather premised on long standing precedent. In
the course of this analysis, Part II also illustrates how the two
laws affect the Constitutional liberties of Americans. The article
concludes by discussing the struggle to maintain privacy and
build safety, in light of the analysis presented, and the criticisms
of the MSEHPA and the HIPAA Privacy Rule.
I.
A.

THE

MSEHPA

AND

HIPAA PROVISIONS

Overview of the Model State Emergency Health
Powers Act16

The MSEHPA is intended to provide order and safety during
a bioterror attack because it authorizes the use of power to gain
control of an epidemic disease outbreak. The MSEHPA is not
necessarily intended to be adopted in its draft form by every
state legislature. Rather, it is designed to provide a framework
from which each state may draw the provisions it feels will be
most beneficial to its citizens, in order to create a final result
that is uniquely tailored to each individual state. 17 The discus16. This overview is not intended to be a complete description of the MSEHPA,
but rather only an outline of its key provisions. The full Act can be found at
www.publichealthlaw.net. For purposes of this article, the MSEHPA is assumed to
remain in the form written Dec. 21, 2001, and is not analyzed under any adaptations
made by state legislatures.
17. Biological and Chemical Terrorism, supra note 2 at 1. The CDC states that:
[tihis draft, adapted from existing state statutory provisions, has been rapidly designed to help start the collaborative process to develop consensusbased model legislation to assist states that are considering new emergency
public health legislation in light of recent events. States may adopt any or all
of the resulting model legislation, as well as tailor it to meet their individual
state's needs, as they deem appropriate.
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sion below highlights the nine key provisions of the MSEHPA in
order to provide a broad understanding of the governmental
powers granted by the Act. A fair reading of the Act indicates
that these powers are broad indeed. A commentary follows the
summary of each of the key provisions.
1.

Planning

The MSEHPA begins by explaining how to plan for a public
health emergency."' The Act calls for the governor to create a
Public Health Emergency Planning Commission (hereinafter
"Commission"), which shall be charged with "deliver[ing] to the
governor a plan for responding to a public health emergency." 19
The Commission is to be comprised of "state directors, or their
designees, from state agencies the governor deems relevant, a
representative group of state legislators, members of the judiciary and any other members deemed appropriate by the governor."20 These members of the Commission must deliver the
plan to the governor within six months of the creation of the
Commission, and they must review the plan annually.21
Comments on the Planning section of the MSEHPA
The charge of the Commission is very broad. In order for the
Commission to accomplish this task in a comprehensive manner
and in the short six-month period of time allowed, it must be
staffed with the most knowledgeable people from a variety of
different fields. For this reason, the governor should not be the
sole official in charge of appointing individuals to the commission. With the input of others, the governor will be better able
to ensure that the broad range of disciplines necessary are represented through the commission. In addition, members of the
Commission must have the liberty to consult non-member experts, in order to access information required to accomplish
their task. This will enable the commission to complete its task
in a thorough and timely manner because it allows the members
to call on other knowledgeable people for assistance, with the
end result an emergency plan that will effectively protect the
public.
18. THE MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS ACT Art. II
(Proposed Official Draft Dec.21, 2001), available at http://www.publichealthlaw.net.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. § 202.
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Reporting

The MSEHPA has a broad reporting requirement. Under the
MSEHPA, health care providers are required to report to public
health authorities "all cases of persons who harbor any illness or
health condition that may be potential causes of a public health
emergency.22 Further, under the Act, pharmacists are required
to report any "unusual or increased prescription rates, unusual
types of prescriptions, or unusual trends in pharmacy visits that
may be potential causes of a public health emergency. '' 23 Also,
the MSEHPA calls for the sharing of information between public health and law enforcement authorities when the information
concerns "suspicious events that may be the cause of a public
24
health emergency.
Comments on the Reporting section of the MSEHPA
The broad reporting requirements of the MSEHPA allow for
effective communication between necessary authorities in the
case of the proliferation of any suspicious conditions or illnesses.
Although the reporting requirements are extensive, they are
necessary to catch a bioterror attack that could affect thousands
of Americans. Without the free exchange of these important indicators of a potential bioterror attack, the devastation and
human toll could possibly be much greater than necessary. By
opening the channels of communication between the public
health authority, pharmacists, health care providers, and law enforcement officials, the MSEHPA creates a first line of defense
against a bioterror attack. These communication channels may
provide enough information to experts to enable them to recognize an outbreak as a bioterror attack before it gains momentum, therefore thwarting a potentially devastating situation.
3.

The Power of the Governor

Under the MSEHPA, the governor of the state declares a
state of public health emergency.25 It is the sole power of the
22. See id. § 301.
23. See id.
24. See id. § 303.
25. See id. § 401.
The MSEHPA defines a public health emergency as:
an occurrence or imminent threat of an illness or health condition that: (1) is
believed to be caused by any of the following: (i) bioterrorism; (ii) the appearance of a novel or previously controlled or eradicated infectious agent
or biological toxin; (iii) [a natural disaster]; (iv) [a chemical attack or acci-
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governor to declare the public health emergency and, importantly, he or she may "act alone to declare a public health
emergency without consulting with the public health authority
'26
. . . when the situation calls for prompt and timely action.
However, "by a majority vote in both chambers, the state legislature may terminate the declaration of a state of public health
27
emergency at any time from the date of original declaration.
The effect of a declaration of a public health emergency is
great. Once an emergency is declared, the disaster response
mechanisms set in place by the Commission, and any other local
response systems, are activated.28 The governor has broad powers during the emergency, including the ability to suspend any
regulatory statutes, transfer personnel in order to facilitate a
more effective response, mobilize the militia, and seek aid from
other states and the federal government. 9 The state executive's
power also encompass: planning and executing public health
emergency assessment, mitigation, preparedness response and
recovery; coordinating activities between the state and local
levels; collaborating with other state or federal authorities; coordinating activities after the public health emergency; and informing the public about the emergency response. 30 Finally, a
declaration of a state of public health emergency can be terminated by an executive order from the Governor, or will automatically terminate after thirty days if the Governor does not
renew the declaration. As described above, the state legislature
may terminate the emergency as well.3 '
Comments on the Power of the Governor section of
the MSEHPA
Critics have highlighted the enormous power given to the governor by this section, claiming that the power is too expansive
dental release; or] (v) [a nuclear attack or accident]; and (2) poses a high
probability of any of the following harms: (i) a large number of deaths in the
affected population; (ii) a large number of serious or long-term disabilities in
the affected population; or (iii) widespread exposure to an infectious or toxic
agent that poses a significant risk of substantial future harm to a large number of people in the affected population.
§ 104(m).
26. See id.
27. See id. § 405.
28. See id. § 403.
29. See id. § 403.
30. See id.
31. See id. § 405.
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and therefore dangerous to grant to one individual.32 Instead,
critics call for the Act to engage a greater number of people in
the decision making process during an emergency. Although it
is the common governing practice in the United States that the
majority rules, circumstances arise under which the normal rules
do not apply. A public health emergency will create chaos.
During a public health emergency, Americans will need leadership, just as they did after the terror attacks on September 11,
2001.
This section of the MSEHPA gives the governor the power to
be a strong leader by granting her the ability to make quick and
necessary decisions that range from mobilizing necessary forces
to suspending laws. This broad authority enables the governor
to coordinate all levels of activities between state and federal
authorities. It is important to recognize that, although this section grants these powers to the governor, the Act does not bar
the governor from consulting with advisors or delegating some
decisions to other officials.
Therefore, this section provides wide latitude for the governor
to act in the manner that she sees most fit, either with or without
assistance. Further, the Act does provide a balance to the governor's power, allowing the legislature to override or terminate
a declaration of a public health emergency.
4.

The Power of the Public Health Authority

When the governor declares a public health emergency, it is
the duty of the public health authority to coordinate all matters
pertaining to state's response. The MSEHPA grants the public
health authority the power to close and compel the evacuation
or decontamination of any facility, which is believed to endanger the public. 33 During an emergency, the public health authority also has the authority to require a health care facility to
provide services or the use of its facility, if the services or uses
are reasonable and necessary for emergency response. 34 Additionally, the public health authority has the power to transfer
management and supervision of the facility to itself for a limited
32.

Jon Dougherty, Bill Would Give Governors Absolute Power, WORLDNET
Jan. 2002, available at http://www.vaccination news.com.
33. See THE MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS ACT § 501
(Proposed Official Draft Dec.21, 2001), available at http://www.publichealthlaw.net.
34. See id. § 502.
DAILY,
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or unlimited period of time, although the period cannot exceed
the termination of the state of public health emergency.
If a shortage of a needed and necessary pharmaceutical exists,
the public health authority is empowered to ration the remaining drugs, regardless of whether it owns the products.36 This
means that during a state of public health emergency, when a
shortage in pharmaceuticals is encountered, the public health
authority may restrict or regulate through rationing, quotas,
price fixing, or any other methods the products it feels necessary
to protect the public.37
Comments on the Power of the Public Health Authority
section of the MSEHPA
Critics of the powers granted to the public health authority by
the MSEHPA have identified these powers as intended to create
a "public health 'police state' that could spur people to panic
and flee. '38 Some groups have even called on Americans to
"[avoid] vaccination; avoid large public areas; be prepared to
self-quarantine; obtain survival food and equipment; move to
the country; and put up a fence with a locked gate. ' 39 These
arguments have little merit. If the public health authority does
not have the power necessary to effectively wage a battle against
a bioterror attack, there is little use in having any power to act
during an emergency at all. The public health authority needs
extensive power in order to effectively eradicate the highly contagious diseases that are used in a bioterror attack. It will be
ineffective to vaccinate only portions of the population against a
highly contagious disease, allowing the remainder to continue to
transmit the disease and increase the number of casualties.

35. See id.
36. See id. § 505.
37. Regulatory Issues Related to Bioterorrism: The Model State Emergency Powers
Act and Disclosure of Identifiable Health Information, HEALTH LAW, Dec. 2001, available at http://www.Dechert.com.
38. Bernadette Tansey, Health Bill Endangers Civil Rights: Bush Pushes Plan to
Expand Control in Bioweapon Attack, S. F. CHRON., Nov. 25, 2001, available at http://
www.sfgate.com.
39. Press Release, Take Action Network, Health Powers Act = Loss of Rights, Feb.
5, 2002, available at http://www.takeactionnetwork.com.
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5. Compensation for Facilities and Materials Taken by
the State
The MSEHPA provides that the state shall pay "just compensation" to the owners of any facilities or materials that are lawfully taken or appropriated by a public health authority for its
temporary or permanent use during a state of public health
emergency. ° The Act requires the public health authority to
"institute appropriate civil proceedings against the property to
be destroyed in accordance with existing state law" if "practicable and consistent with the protection of public health."' 41 A citizen may bring an action against the public health authority for
compensation in state courts. 42 The amount of the compensation must be calculated in the same way as compensation due
for taking of property under non-emergent eminent domain
proceedings.43 However, the state is not required to compensate
the owners of facilities or materials that are closed, evacuated,
decontaminated, or destroyed when there is reasonable cause to
believe that they may endanger the public health pursuant to
the MSEHPA.44
Comments on the Compensation for Facilities and Materials
Taken by the State section of the MSEHPA
This section of the MSEHPA is in accordance with the takings
clause of the Fifth Amendment, except for one provision.45 The
exception is in the case of an emergency, where the public
health authority may destroy, evacuate, or close a facility that is
believed to be a threat to public health, without providing just
compensation to the owner. The MSEHPA should break this
provision into two separate terms. The Act must first discuss
the destruction of property, which is likely a per se taking under
40. See THE MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS ACT § 506
(Proposed Official Draft Dec.21, 2001), available at http://www.publichealthlaw.net.
41. Id. § 507.
42. See id. § 805(b).
43. See id. § 805(c).
44. See id. § 506.
45. The Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States prohibits governmental taking of a private citizen's property for a public purpose without just compensation, regardless of whether the acquisition is a result of condemnation
proceedings or physical appropriations. However, the Fifth Amendment also provides a basis for drawing a distinction between physical takings and the regulation of
private property. The private citizen does not necessarily have to be compensated for
the regulatory action. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning
Agency, 122 S.Ct. 1465, 1478 (2002).
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the Fifth Amendment because all economic value is drained
from the property, providing just compensation to the property
owner where appropriate. In the second provision, the
MSEHPA should discuss the state actions that may constitute
regulation of the private property, because the property will retain some economic value, including the evacuation or closure
of a facility.
According to the Supreme Court holding in Tahoe-Sierra
Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional PlanningAgency,
when the government interferes with a property right due to a
"public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic
life to promote the common good," the governmental action
must be balanced against the burden it places on the private citizen. 46 Therefore, when the state action under the MSEHPA is
not a per se taking, the Act must allow for all factors to be balanced in order to determine whether the property owner must
be compensated. The MSEHPA's blanket approach of permitting a wide range of governmental actions that may constitute a
taking, without any compensation, should not stand.
6.

Control of Persons

During a state of emergency, the MSEHPA allows the state
public health authority to compel an individual to submit to examination, testing, and treatment.47 Included in this power is
the public health authority's right to "vaccinate persons as protection against infectious disease and to prevent the spread of
46. Id. at 1480-89. The Petitioners asserted that the respondent's moratoria
prohibiting development on the Lake Tahoe Basin for thirty-two months constituted a
taking of their property, for which they were not justly compensated. The District
Court found that the respondent's moratoria to be a taking under the categorical
rule, because the petitioners were denied all economically viable use of their land.
On appeal, the issue was whether the categorical rule applied to the circumstances
presented, given the fact that the moratoria only temporarily affected the land. The
Court of Appeals held that the categorical rule did not apply because the regulation
only affected the petitioner's land for a short period of time. The issue taken to the
Supreme Court was whether the moratoria constituted per se takings, requiring compensation under the Fifth Amendment. In its discussion, the Supreme Court identified the distinctions between acquisitions of property for public use and regulations
prohibiting private use. The Court concluded that the moratoria in question constituted regulation, not taking, which was best examined by weighing all of the relevant
circumstances that the Court recognized in Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City,
438 U.S. 104 (1978). The Supreme Court held that the petitioners were not entitled to
compensation under the Fifth Amendment.
47. See THE MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS ACT § 603
(Proposed Official Draft Dec.21, 2001), available at http://www.publichealthlaw.net.
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contagious or possibly contagious disease. '48 If an individual
refuses to abide by rules, orders, or provisions pertaining to isolation and quarantine, he may be charged with a misdemeanor.4 9
If an individual refuses vaccination during a public health emergency "for reasons of health, religion, or conscience, the public
health authority may isolate or quarantine" the individual.50
The MSEHPA establishes guidelines for isolation and quarantine. The public health authority may isolate and quarantine individuals who have not been vaccinated, treated, tested, or
examined.5 1 Generally, the public health authority must obtain
a written, ex parte court order before isolating or quarantining a
person, unless a delay in isolation or quarantine would pose an
immediate threat to the public health.52 However, an individual
may be isolated or quarantined without a court order in the
event that "delay would significantly jeopardize the public
health authority's ability to prevent or limit the contagious or
possibly contagious disease. '5 3 If a person is quarantined without a court order due to an immediate threat to public health, a
court order must be obtained within 10 days of the quarantine.54
Any person isolated or quarantined may request relief from detention by application to the trial court for an "order to show
good cause why the individual or group of individuals should
not be released. ' 55 Any refusal to obey isolation or quarantine
requirements constitutes a misdemeanor. 6
Comments on the Control of Person Section of the MSEHPA
This section of the MSEHPA threatens individual autonomy.
Although this section grants the public health authority sweeping powers over an individual's right to self-determination, it is
not necessarily an inappropriate provision. This provision works
very closely with the Power of the Public Health Authority section, to ensure that the public health authority has all of the
tools necessary to effectively fight a bioterror attack. Americans have never been confronted with a bioterror attack that
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See

id.
id.
id.
id.
id.
id.
id.
id.
id.

§ 603(a).
§ 604.
§ 603(a)(3).
§ 604(a).
§ 605.
§ 605(a)(1).
§ 605(a)(4).
§ 605(c)(1).
§ 604(a) and (c).
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affected the population to the degree of smallpox, or any other
exceptionally contagious pathogen. Therefore, the possibility
that the public health authority may have to exercise the powers
granted by this section might, at first blush, seem outrageous to
the public. Unfortunately, it is not.
The powers described here are those that may, with little alternative, be required in such emergency. The most difficult
possibility for Americans to accept is the idea of losing freedom,
which is what is presented here, to a degree. 7 However, in the
process of realizing that a bioterror attack may be the next interface with terrorists, Americans must also understand that the
powers described here will be critical in combating such an
attack.
7.

Access to and Disclosure of Protected Health Information

The MSEHPA addresses access to PHI of individuals who
have participated in medical testing, treatment, vaccination, isolation, or quarantine programs. 58 The Act allows persons who
have a "legitimate need to acquire or use the information" to
have access to PHI for the purposes of treating the individual
who is the subject of the PHI, conducting epidemiological research, or investigating the cause of the transmission. 59 Before
a public health authority can disclose PHI, the individual must
give written "specific informed consent. ' 60 However, the PHI
may be released without a specific consent when the disclosure
is (i) to the individual who is the subject of the PHI or to his
family; (ii) to the appropriate federal authorities; (iii) to health
care personnel where there is a need to protect the health or life
of the individual who is the subject of the PHI; (iv) pursuant to a
court order to avert a clear danger to an individual or the public
health; or (v) to identify a deceased individual or determine the
manner or cause of death.61

57.
SLAVE

See Jesse Berney, The Beginning of the End for the Constitution?, WAGE
J., Nov. 1, 2001, available at http://www.wage-slave.org/20011121.constitution.

html.
58. See THE MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS ACT § 607
(Proposed Official Draft Dec.21, 2001), available at http://www.publichealthlaw.net.
59. See id. § 607(a).
60. See id. § 607(b).
61. See id.§ 607(b)(1-5).
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Comments on the Access to and Disclosure of Protected
Health Information Section of the MSEHPA
Although this section permits liberal release of PHI, it is in
line with the disclosures permitted in emergency situations
under HIPAA.6 2 The two Acts' agreement on the level of disclosure of PHI during an emergency does not necessarily indicate these disclosure allowances are correct. However, two
independent bodies reaching similar conclusions is evidence that
it will be necessary to allow for disclosure of PHI under such
circumstances.
What constitutes an adequate level of PHI disclosure during
an emergency cannot be completely determined in an accurate
manner until such a public health emergency actually occurs.
However, providers and authorities must have access to all necessary PHI in order to act quickly and avert a dangerous situation from threatening a greater number of individuals. If the
health care providers or public health authorities do not have
access to the PHI necessary to treat individuals, they may be
forced to make a decision between doing their job ineffectively
and breaking the law to obtain all of the necessary tools to allow
them to act in accordance with the recognized standards. This is
an unfair burden to place on these workers.
8.

Licensing and Appointment of Health Personnel/ Liability
During a state of public health emergency, the public health
authority has the ability to require in-state healthcare providers
to assist with various medical services and to "appoint and prescribe the duties of out-of-state emergency health care providers
as may be reasonable and necessary to respond to the public
health emergency. ' 63 This power includes the ability to waive
all licensure requirements, permits, and fees for health care
providers from other jurisdictions to practice in the state.64
While granting public health authorities these powers, the
MSEHPA provides that, except in cases of gross negligence or
willful misconduct, neither the state nor its political subdivisions
62. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.506(a)(3) (2002), 164.510(a)(3) (2002), 164.508(a) (2002),
164.512(a) (2002), 164.512(b) (2002), 164.512(f) (2002), 164.512(f)(6) (2002),
164.512(g) (2002), 164.5120) (2002), 164.512(k) (2002). These HIPAA provisions allow for certain disclosures of protected health information.
63. See THE MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS ACT § 608
(a)-(b) (Proposed Official Draft Dec.21, 2001), available at http://www.publichealth
law.net.
64. See id. § 608(b)(2).
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may be held liable for the death or injury to any person or property damage that occurs as a result of complying with or attempting to comply with the MSEHPA or regulations
promulgated thereunder.
This immunity also applies to the
state, the public health authority, and any other state or local
official who is "referenced" under the Act.66 However, any of
these authorities can be held liable for "gross negligence or willful misconduct" in relation to any power delegated to them
under the MSEHPA. 67 Additionally, the Act states that except
in cases of gross negligence or willful misconduct, any private
person, corporation, or firm that renders advice or assistance at
the request of the state during a public health emergency may
not be held liable for causing the death of or injury to a person,
or for any property damage.68
Comments on the Liability and Appointment of Health
Personnel Sections of the MSEHPA
Although these two sections do not focus solely on out-ofstate public health workers who work in a different state during
a public health emergency, the ease with which this section allows the state to recruit workers who may not be adequately
trained provides little chance of the workers being held accountable for any mistake and stands out as disconcerting. However,
it is also unsettling that fully licensed state public health workers, as well as many other categories of individuals, are shielded
in the same manner.
Additionally, these sections do not answer the question of
whom, if anyone, is liable for bad outcomes from vaccinations,
or other medical procedures conducted under the MSEHPA,
whether by in-state or out-of-state workers. The failure to provide for liability at a lower level of injury occurrence (when an
action is damaging, but not one of gross negligence or willful
misconduct) leads to the conclusion that the authors of this Act
and the government believe that the effort to save a life that was
in peril as a result of a bioterror agent is compensation enough
for any injury that comes from the attempt, because without this
system established by the MSEHPA, the individual may not
have received treatment at all.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id.
See id. § 804(a).
See id.
See id. § 804(b)(3).
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Although it is important that all Americans cooperate during
an emergency in order for the situation to be effectively addressed, the government cannot expect individuals to obey
every order of the public health authority and then have no
means of recourse against harmful activity, except under extreme circumstances. Provision of liability at a lower level must
be added to the MSEHPA, especially when the public health
authority is knowingly recruiting workers who may not be licensed in accordance with state standards. It will be impossible
to provide compensation for every mistake made during an
emergency; however, the MSEHPA must provide for liability
under a greater number of situations.
B.

The Health Insurance Portabilityand Accountability Act
of 1996

Americans are deeply concerned that health information is
not private. 69 Breaches of health information privacy take many
forms. For example, recently a hacker downloaded the medical
records, health information, and social security numbers of
more than five thousand patients at the University of Washington Medical Center-the University conceded that its privacy
and security safeguards were not adequate. 70 In yet another illustration of a breach of privacy of health information, an FBI
agent was forced into early retirement after the government
learned that he had sought treatment for a mental health condition.71 The agent's mental health information was uncovered
during a fraud investigation against the psychiatrist who was
treating him.72
Americans have responded to concerns of privacy breaches by
demanding protection of medical information. The American
public has recognized that the right to privacy does not end
69. Making PatientPrivacy a Reality: Does the Final HHS Regulation Get the Job
Done?: Hearing Before the Senate Committee on Health, Education Labor & Pensions, Feb. 8, 2001, at 4 (statement of Janlori Goldman, Director of Health Privacy
Project, Georgetown University Institute for Health Care Research and Policy) [hereinafter Goldman Testimony], available at http://www.healthprivacy.org/usr-doc/
48751.pdf. According to recent reports, one out of every six people engages in some
form of privacy-protective behavior to shield themselves from the misuse of their
health information, including withholding information, providing inaccurate information, doctor-hopping to avoid consolidated medical records, paying out of pocket for
procedures covered by insurance, and avoiding health care altogether.
70. Goldman Testimony, supra note 69, at 4.
71. Id. at 5.
72. Id.
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where PHI begins. Recent reports and public opinion surveys
suggest that 85% of the polled public believe that protecting the
confidentiality of medical records is "absolutely essential" or
"very important" in health care reform. Additionally, 86% of
polled public favor creating a "national medical privacy board"
to "hold hearings, issue regulations and enforce standards" for
protecting medical information privacy.73 This concern reflects
the significant changes in the nation's health care system, including the shift to electronic medical records, the daily transfer of
highly sensitive patient information between employers, managed care organizations, other health care entities, and the great
advances in genetic research that reveal a large amount of information about future health conditions.74 HIPAA provides the
"first systematic nationwide privacy protection for health information", reaching almost every person and entity who touches
medical and financial information in the health care system.75
Through HIPAA, Congress has attempted to create a "national
'76
standard of privacy protection.
In the event of a public health emergency, numerous provisions of HIPAA allow for the release of PHI, without the protections required by the Act under most other circumstances.77
Supporters who believe that the standardization and security
provided by HIPAA will play an important role in homeland
security have praised these exceptions. 78 These advocates believe that standardization and ease of transmission of health information during a bioterror attack will be a key component in
73. See Harris Equifax, Health Information Privacy Survey, 1993, available at
http://www.epic.org/privacy/medical/polls.html.
74. Lawrence 0. Gostin, National Health Information Privacy, Regulations, Under
the Health Insurance Portabilityand Accountability Act, JAMA, Vol. 285, No. 23, June
20, 2001, at 3015.
75. Gostin, supra note 74, at 3016.
76. Bill Bysinger, Homeland Security: The Need For HIPAA, MILLENIUM
HEALTHCARE NEWS, Oct. 24, 2001, available at http://www.healthleaders.com/news/
feature 1.php?contentid=28855.
77. 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.508 (2002), 164.502 (2002), 164.506 (2002), 164.510 (2002),
164.512 (2002). The HIPAA privacy rule restricts access to PHI. Access is restricted
through the implementation of more stringent guidelines for the use and disclosure of
PHI. The HIPPA provisions discussed in this article do not follow the general rule
promulgated by HIPPA. Instead, these provisions allow for the use and disclosure of
PHI, without adhering to the HIPAA privacy rule requirements. These provisions are
not written as exceptions to the general privacy rule; however, they do function as
exceptions because they explain situations under which the general privacy rule does
not have to be followed in the same manner that is required by the bulk of the Privacy
Rule.
78. Bysinger, supra note 76.
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protecting citizens. 9 It has also been theorized that through
HIPAA's standardization and security, PHI may be kept out of
terrorists' hands, and therefore, prevent them from targeting
specific groups of Americans who may be most susceptible to a
bioterror attack. 80 The groups that support HIPAA recognize
that "nothing is beyond the scope of the opportunity for terrorists, [and that] we must make our data sources secure," and
work vigilantly to maintain the security that HIPAA provides.81
The provisions of HIPAA that do not require the same strict
regulation of PHI as the rest of the Act give health care providers and the public health authority considerable leeway during
public health emergencies. The exceptions facilitate an easy
flow of necessary PHI during a public health emergency; however, there are limits to the amount of disclosure permitted. Below is a summary of the HIPAA provisions that permit the
disclosure of PHI without the standard consent regulations during a public health emergency.
1.

Consent for Treatment, Payment and Health Care
Operations (45 C.F.R. § 164.506(a)(3))
During an "emergency treatment situation,"82 a health care
provider may release PHI without a signed treatment, payment,
and operations consent as long as the health care provider attempts to obtain consent as soon as "reasonably practicable" after the treatment is given.83 Additionally, the provider must
document his attempts to obtain consent, and if consent is not
obtained, document the reasons why.84
Comments on Consent for Treatment, Payment and Health
Care Operations
This provision is logical. Most health care providers follow
this policy everyday on the job. Under these circumstances patients are, presumably, grateful that the health care providers
did not delay in order to obtain consent for treatment, because
the delay of a few minutes may change the outcome of a situation. There is little difference between this daily occurrence and
this HIPAA provision. When a patient requires immediate
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Note. An "emergency treatment situation" is not defined by HIPAA.
45 C.F.R. § 164.506(a)(3) (2002).
Id.
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treatment, the more information that the health care provider
has, the better able she will be to treat the patient. For example,
if a patient must be vaccinated and his doctor has his history of
allergies, it is to both the patient's benefit, and the benefit of the
public health worker who gives the vaccinations for the doctor
to release the information to the worker. This prevents the patient from receiving any treatment that he is known not to
tolerate.
2.

Directories: Disclosures concerning victims who have
been treated (45 C.F.R. § 164.510(a)(3))

Normally under HIPAA, a patient must be given the opportunity to opt out of having his PHI disclosed in a facility directory."' If an individual does not choose to opt out, information
including his name, location of the facility, his condition described generally, and his religious affiliation may be recorded
in a facility directory that is available to the public.8 6 However,
if a patient's opportunity to opt out of having his information
disclosed "cannot be practicably provided because of incapacity
or the emergency treatment circumstances", the patient's PHI
may be disclosed in the facility directory.87 Before disclosing the
PHI, the provider must confirm that disclosure is in the patient's
best interest, and that disclosure is consistent with previously expressed preferences of the patient.8 8 If a patient's PHI is disclosed in the facility directory under these circumstances, the
provider must give the patient an opportunity to object to the
disclosure as soon as practicable. 9
Comments on Directories
This provision establishes safeguards over PHI. If the patient
does not have the opportunity to opt out of having her information disclosed in the facility directory, the health care provider
either must act in accordance with the patient's previous wishes
85. 45 C.F.R. § 164.510 (2002). A facility directory is a log of patients that is
maintained by the health care facility. The facility directory contains the patient's
name, location in the facility, condition, and religious affiliation. Under normal circumstances, if the patient does not opt out of having her information listed in the
facility directory, all of the information in the directory may be disclosed to a clergy
member, and all of the information except the patient's religious affiliation may be
disclosed to any individual who asks for the patient by name.
86. 45 C.F.R. § 164.510(a)(i)(A)-(D) (2002).
87. 45 C.F.R. § 164.510(a)(3) (2002).
88. 45 C.F.R. § 164.510(a)(3)(A)-(B) (2002).
89. 45 C.F.R. § 164.510(a)(3)(ii) (2002).
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or in the best interest of the patient. If the health care provider
is not the patient's regular physician or nurse, which is likely
under emergency conditions, the provider should be guided by
the patient's best interest.90 Health care providers handle sensitive information on a daily basis and, therefore, are aware of the
importance of confidentiality. These factors lead to the conclusion that if the health care provider cannot determine the patient's previous wishes pertaining to the disclosure of his
information in the facility directory, the health care provider
will act in a discrete and respectful manner.
3.

Disclosures for Public Health Activities (45 C.F.R.
§ 164.512(b))

Under this provision, a covered entity may disclose PHI in
order to facilitate a public health activity.91 Public health activities include the following actions: "preventing or controlling
disease, injury, or disability, including, but not limited to, the
reporting of disease, injury, vital events such as birth or death,
the conduct of public health surveillance, public health investigations, and public health interventions. "92 Under this section, a
covered entity may also disclose PHI to individuals who may
have been exposed to a communicable disease, or who may be
at risk of contracting or spreading
a disease, if the covered entity
93
is permitted to do so by law.
Comments on Disclosures for Public Health Activities
This section permits extremely broad disclosure of PHI for
public health activities. Although broad disclosure may be necessary to facilitate a public health activity, this section needs to
better define what PHI can be disclosed, and what degree of
disclosure is allowed. For example, pursuant to this section PHI
may be disclosed for "public health intervention." A public
health intervention activity can range from handing out flyers to
placing individuals under quarantine. The level of PHI that is
necessary for these activities is as diverse as the activities them90. However, this provision provides another solid argument for the liberal release of PHI under emergency circumstances. If the treating provider has access to
the patient's PHI, he will be able to determine what the patient's previous wishes
were in relation to the release of his information in the facility directory and then act
in accordance.
91. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(b) (2002).
92. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(b)(i) (2002).
93. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(b)(iv) (2002).
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selves. It is obvious that no PHI need be disclosed for the first
activity, but that a great deal will be released when an individual
is under quarantine. Additionally, by providing more rigid
guidelines, a check will be created for the public health authority's activities. These definitions will give the public health authority a more substantial framework to operate within,
therefore reducing the likelihood of releasing unnecessary
information.
4.

94
Disclosures Required by Law (45 C.F.R. § 164.512(a))

This section allows a covered entity to use or disclose PHI
without consent from the patient and without giving the patient
the opportunity to object to the disclosure. 95 Under this provision, a covered entity may use or disclose PHI to the extent required by law, as long as the disclosure complies with the law,
and it is limited to the relevant requirements of the law.96
Disclosures for Law Enforcement Purposes (45 C.F.R.
§ 164.512(f))
As long as certain conditions are met, covered entities may
disclose PHI for law enforcement purposes, in accordance with
the stated process and as otherwise required by law.97 The approved circumstances allow covered entities to release PHI in
response to a court order or a court ordered warrant, a subpoena or summons issued by a judicial officer, a grand jury subpoena, or an administrative request, including a subpoena or
summons, a civil or an authorized investigative demand, or another similar process that is authorized by law.98 Any of these
disclosures are allowed, as long as the information sought is relevant and material to a legitimate law enforcement inquiry,99
the request is specific and limited in scope to what is practicable
for the purpose of the inquiry, 100 and there was no reasonable
way that de-identified information could have been used. 101
5.

94. Comments on this section are provided collectively after a review of the
following sections on the Disclosures Required by Law, Disclosures for Law
Enforcement Purposes, and Permitted Disclosures: Reporting Crimes in an
Emergency.
95. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512 (2002).
96. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(a) (2002).
97. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(f)(1) (2002).
98. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(f)(1)(ii)(A)-(C) (2002).
99. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(f)(ii)(C)(1) (2002).
100. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(f)(ii)(C)(2) (2002).
101. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(f)(ii)(C)(3) (2002).
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Generally, disclosure to law enforcement officials must be
done at the request of the official.1 0 2 In most cases, a covered
entity is not permitted to actively solicit a law enforcement official in order to alert him to a patient's suspect status or PHI,
with the exception that, if there is a state mandatory reporting
law, a covered entity may disclose the PHI to a law enforcement
10 3
official, at its own initiative, without the patient's consent.
This provision also allows for disclosure of PHI in response to
a law enforcement official for the "purpose of identifying or locating a suspect, fugitive, material witness, or missing person. "104
In this situation, the covered entity may release the name and
address, date and place of birth, social security number, blood
type and Rh factor, type of injury, date and time of treatment,
date and time of death (if applicable), and a description of distinguishing characteristics. 10 5 Such a disclosure would be necessary in a public health emergency when an individual who is
either diagnosed with a communicable disease or suspected of
carrying a communicable disease flees a treatment facility. The
release of this permitted information could be of great assistance to law enforcement officials tracking the individual in order to prevent him from spreading the illness to others.
According to the preamble to the final HIPAA privacy rule, "a
request by a law enforcement official or agency" includes a request broadcast through the media for assistance in identifying a
suspect, including "wanted" posters, and other types of public
announcements.01 6
Further, this provision permits the disclosure of PHI, with the
agreement of the patient, in response to a law enforcement official's request for information about a person who is the victim of
a crime, or who is a suspected victim of a crime. 7 Under this
exception, the patient must agree to the disclosure by the covered entity. 108 However, if the covered entity is unable to obtain
the patient's consent due to either an emergency situation or to
the individual being incapacitated, the covered entity may re102. Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65
Fed. Reg. 82,462 (Dec. 28, 2000) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160 and 164).
103. Id.
104. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(f)(2) (2002).
105. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(f)(2)(i)(A)-(H) (2002).
106. Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65
Fed. Reg. 82,462 (Dec. 28, 2000) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160 and 164).
107. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(f)(3) (2002).
108. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(f)(3)(ii) (2002).
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lease the PHI, as long as the information is necessary to determine whether a law has been violated by a person other than the
patient; the immediate law enforcement activity depends on the
disclosure of the PHI, and the situation would be adversely affected by waiting until the individual is able to consent; and the
disclosure of the PHI is in the best interests of the individual, as
determined by the covered entity.10 9 Covered entities may also
disclose PHI about deceased patients to law enforcement officials in order to alert the law enforcement official of the death, if
the covered entity believes that the death may be the result of
criminal conduct. 110
Permitted Disclosure: Reporting Crimes in an Emergency
(45 C.F.R. § 164.512(f)(6))
HIPAA allows health care providers who provide care in response to an emergency situation to disclose PHI to law enforcement officials."' In an emergency situation, providers of
emergency care may disclose PHI to law enforcement officials if
the disclosure is necessary to inform law enforcement officials of
the commission and nature of a crime; the location of a crime or
of the victims of a crime; and the identity, description, and location of the perpetrator of such crime.1 12 This provision applies
to first responders in the emergency health care situation, including emergency medical technicians." 3
6.

Comments on Disclosures for All Law Enforcement
Related Provisions
The provisions that allow for the release of PHI for law enforcement purposes all have the common goal of protecting an
individual or the public from the further spread of the threatening disease by sharing PHI with law enforcement officers. With
a few exceptions, these provisions only allow for the release of
PHI in response to a request from law enforcement officials.
This requirement should provide sanctity to PHI, because it prohibits health care providers from actively distributing information. However, the definition of a "request by law enforcement
officials" is too broad. As discussed above, this type of request
109. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(f)(3)(iii)(A)-(B) (2002).
110. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(f)(4) (2002).
111. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(f)(6) (2002).
112. 45 C.F.R. §164.512(f)(6)(A)-(C) (2002).
113. Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65
Fed. Reg. 82,462 (Dec. 28, 2000) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160 and 164).
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includes media broadcasts, "wanted" posters, and other types of
public announcements. The release of PHI should be permitted
in the case of a direct request to a health care professional from
law enforcement officials, under the specific outlined circumstances. General solicitations to the public should not be
permitted.
Finally, in response to a request for PHI by law enforcement
officials, only the PHI necessary to aid the officials should be
released. For example, law enforcement officials should not be
given the Rh factor of an individual if they can determine identity by the color of his hair. This restriction helps to ensure that
the law enforcement official receives only PHI absolutely necessary to accomplish her task. Also, this protects the privacy of
the individual whose PHI is disclosed to the greatest degree possible under the circumstances.
7.

Uses and Disclosures to Avert Serious Threat to Health or
Safety (45 C.F.R. §164.512(j))

Consistent with the applicable laws and standards of ethical
conduct, a covered entity may use or disclose protected health
information, if it believes in good faith that the use or disclosure
is necessary to prevent or lesson an imminent threat to the
health or safety of the public. 1 14 The disclosure must be to an
individual who has the reasonable ability to prevent or lessen
15
the likelihood of the imminent threat from actually occurring.'
Also, covered entities may disclose PHI if the entity believes
that the disclosure is necessary for law enforcement authorities
to identify or apprehend an individual, because of a statement
by an individual admitting participation in a violent crime that
the covered entity "reasonably believes may have caused serious
physical harm to the victim. 11 6 However, this type of disclosure
is not permitted if the covered entity uncovers the PHI while
treating an individual for a propensity to commit the criminal
conduct that is the basis for the disclosure.117
There is a "presumption of good faith" when a covered entity
uses or discloses PHI to avoid a public health emergency. 118 The
good faith belief must be based on the covered entity's actual
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

45
45
45
45
45

C.F.R.
C.F.R.
C.F.R.
C.F.R.
C.F.R.

§ 164.5120) (2002).
§ 164.512(j)(i)(B) (2002).
§ 164.512(j)(ii)(A) (2002).
§ 164.512(j)(2)(i) (2002).
§ 164.5120)(4) (2002).
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knowledge, or in reliance on a credible representation by a person with apparent knowledge or authority." 119 In the preamble
to the HIPAA privacy regulations, the Department of Health
and Human Services notes that a "person with apparent knowledge or apparent authority" may include any person, not just a
2 0
doctor, law enforcement official, or other government official.
The preamble goes on to explain that this provision allows for
the covered entity to use or disclose PHI without an authorization, and on its own initiative (without the requirement of a request by a law enforcement official, as is necessary elsewhere in
the statute) when it is "necessary to prevent or lessen a serious
and imminent threat, consistent with other applicable ethical or
legal standards.' 1 21 However, the Department of Health and
Human Services states that this provision was not developed
with the intent of creating a duty to warn; rather, it was the intent of the Department to only permit disclosures to avoid a
"serious and imminent" threat to health and safety where law
22
otherwise permits it.'
Comments on Uses and Disclosures to Avert Serious Threat
to Health or Safety
This standard gives a health care provider the authority to release PHI under two conditions where authority for the release
is generally presumed to already exist. First, the provider may
release PHI when it is reasonably necessary. Ostensibly, the
"reasonably necessary" standard here is the same or similar to
the reasonable person standard used currently. Therefore, it is
expected that a health care professional would release PHI
when a reasonable person would do so because the information
may protect the public. Second, under this provision, health
care providers are authorized to release PHI where law otherwise permits it; therefore, this provision does not grant a provider any new authority to release PHI.
119. Id.
120. Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65
Fed. Reg. 82,462 (Dec. 28, 2000) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160 and 164).
121. Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65
Fed. Reg. 82,462-01 (Dec. 28, 2000) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160 and 164),
available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/admnsimp/.
122. Id. Note the "duty to warn a third person at risk" standard that is promulgated in HIPAA is consistent with case law, which originated in Tarasoff v. Regents of
the Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425 (1976).
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Uses and Disclosures for Specialized Government
Functions (45 C.F.R. § 164.512(k))

If an activity is deemed "necessary by appropriate military
command authorities to assure the proper execution of [a] military mission," then a covered entity may use and disclose the
PHI of a member of the Armed Forces. 123 Additionally, covered entities may use or disclose the PHI of Armed Forces personnel to "authorized federal officials for the conduct of lawful
intelligence, counter-intelligence, and other national security activities. ' ' 124 The preamble states that this provision does not
confer to covered entities any new authority to use and disclose
protected health information gained in the provision of health
care to individuals who are Armed Forces personnel, unless
is used for the furthering of a military
such information
5
mission.

12

Comments on Uses and Disclosures for Specialized
Government Functions
This section does not grant any new authority to release the
PHI of Armed Forces personnel. Additionally, the disclosures
made under this section are considered necessary to protect the
individual or group of military personnel from spreading or acquiring a contagious pathogen.
9.

Verification Requirements (45 C.F.R. § 164.514(h))

The privacy regulations of HIPAA require the verification of
the authority and the identity of the public officials to whom a
covered entity is disclosing PHI.126 The authority of a public official may be verified by a covered entity through any of the
following ways: (i) a written statement of legal authority under
which the information is requested; (ii) an oral statement of
such legal authority; (iii) pursuant to legal process, warrant, subpoena, order, or other legal process issued by a grand jury; (iv) a
tribunal that is presumed to constitute legal authority; or (v)
when the covered entity relies on the exercise of professional
judgment with respect to directory issues or acts on a good faith
belief in making a disclosure to avoid a serious threat to health
123. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(k) (2002).
124. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(k)(2) (2002).
125. Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65
Fed. Reg. 82,462-01 (Dec. 28, 2000) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160 and 164).
126. 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(h)(1)(i) (2002).
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or safety. 127 If reliance is "reasonable under the circumstances,"
a covered entity may rely on a requested disclosure from a public official as the "minimum necessary for the stated purpose," if
the public official represents that the information requested is
the minimum necessary for the stated purpose.128
Comments on Verification Requirements
The verification requirement of HIPAA is an example of an
excellent check provided under the Act. However, it may not
be reasonable to believe that this safeguard will be employed
during a public health emergency. During an attack, time will
be of the essence. For this reason, it is unreasonable to believe
that this HIPAA verification requirement will be followed. The
primary focus will be on treating and preventing the spread of
disease, not looking for identification badges and authorization
papers.
II.

CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS: THE

MSEHPA

AND

HIPAA

Public health laws have a long history in the United States.
Striking a balance between protecting Constitutional rights and
maintaining a strong and useful public health system is a dilemma that has plagued America for centuries. 12 9 This struggle
began long before the development of anthrax, smallpox, and
nerve gas. Public health regulations began with sanitation laws
and have spanned the decades of the plague, yellow fever, the
Spanish influenza, and Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome.1 30 The Court's grant of power to the states in Holmes v.
127. 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(h)(2)(iii)(A)-(B)(iv)
(2002); 45 C.F.R.
§ 164.514(h)(2)(iv) (2002).
128. 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(d)(3)(iii) (2002).
129. See Edward P. Richards, The Jurisprudenceof Prevention: The Rights of Societal Self Defense Against Dangerous Persons, 16 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 320, 330
(1989), available at http://biotech.law.Isu.edu/cphl/articles/hastings/hastings-contents.htm (the author writes that the Constitution leaves the responsibility of building
and maintaining a public health system to the states, under the police power.) Police
power is described as a:
general system of precaution, either for the prevention of crimes or calamities. Its business may be distributed into eight distinct branches: 1. Police
for the prevention of offenses; 2. Police for the prevention of calamities; 3.
Police for the prevention of epidemic diseases; 4. Police of charity; 5. Police
of interior communications; 6. Police of public amusements; 7. Police for recent intelligence 8. Police for registration.)
Id. at 337.
130. Id. at 335.
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Jennison13 1 was an acknowledgement of the public's fear of infectious diseases, and of the need for the government to have
liberal access to power to control dangerous situations.132 Paraequal danger,
doxically, today, when bioterror agents present an133
fear.
this
lost
has
seemingly
public
the American
Modern courts have agreed with the Holmes v. Jennison
Court, issuing opinions about public health laws that are consistent with the historical holding. It has become the practice of
courts to uphold public health laws that focus on the prevention
of disease and future harm, despite the substantial restrictions
that such laws may place on individual liberties.13 4 This "jurisprudence of prevention"' 135 represents the judicial and legislative
reaction to real and perceived dangers that exist in American
society.' 36 If a court concludes that the purpose of a law is prevention instead of punishment, it gives the state greater latitude
during judicial review to rely on expert decision makers, utilize
than pre-trial hearings, and
habeas corpus proceedings rather
1 37
use lower standards of proof.
The MSEHPA is a prevention law. There are many similarities between the MSEHPA and the line of preventive jurisprudence decisions. Both have received similar criticism. Just as
the courts have been denounced for their preventative holdings
that have "limited the presumption of innocence to criminal trials, [and] endorsed the preventive detention of adults and
so have MSEHPA opponents
juveniles" in public health cases, 138sohv
condemned the law for "giv[ing] state public health authorities
virtually absolute dictatorial powers, with little chance of legal
131.
129.
132.
133.

Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. 540 (1840). See generally Richards, supra note

Richards, supra note 129, at 333.
Id. at 336.
"This diminishing support for public health restrictions is less rooted in an
increased sensitivity to individual liberties than it is a product of the loss of
fear of communicable diseases. With the advent of sanitary measures such
as pasteurization of milk and the development of antibiotics, society's fear of
communicable diseases has declined."
134. Id. at 338.
135. See id. The "jurisprudence of prevention" is a term describing holdings that
allow substantial restrictions on individual liberties pursuant to public health laws that
seek to prevent future harm, rather than punish wrongs.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 331.
138. Id. at 332.
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recourse for interned individuals. ' 139 The similar criticisms are
due, in part, to the strong likeness between the Act and many of
the preventative jurisprudence holdings.
This section will examine three Constitutional liberties violated by the Act: the lack of due process provided under the
Act; the invasion of privacy permitted by the Act; and the taking
of property without just compensation. 140 The court's past treatment of these rights will be traced, and then the MSEHPA and
HIPAA provisions will be analyzed and summarized in light of
their relation to the historical public law holdings. 41
1.

Power-The Courts Allow Detention without Due Process

Decisions that focus on the prevention of a public health
problem reject the traditional principle that individuals may not
be detained without the due process protections established by
In re Gault14 2 and In re Winship. 143 These two cases established
139. CDC Advances Totalitarian Legislation Under Guise of 'Public Health:'
Forced Drugging and Injections Are On The Horizon, Nov. 9, 2001, available at
www.tetrahedron.org/news/NRO11109.html.
140. Eberhart, David, Model State Bioterror Law Stirs Controversy, Jan. 3, 2002,
available at http://www.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2002/2/152159.shtml (arguing
that the Act will "intrude on Americans' civil liberties.., because [c]itizens who refuse to comply can be detained and charged with a misdemeanor").
141. Although the applicable HIPAA provisions discussed here have not been as
widely criticized as the MSEHPA for threatening Constitutional liberties, its provisions do detract somewhat from the right to privacy in times of a public health emergency. Therefore, they are included in this discussion with the MSEHPA to illustrate
how modem day activity in this area compares to past regulation.
142. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (wherein the Court committed a minor to the
State Industrial School as a juvenile delinquent, because he was found to have violated a law by making lewd telephone calls. The minor had filed a writ of habeas
corpus challenging the procedure used in his case, which was subsequently dismissed.
The appellant's mother, on behalf of the minor, appealed the dismissal. In its decision
affirming the dismissal of the writ, the Supreme Court declared, "due process of law is
the primary and indispensable foundation of individual freedom. It is the basic and
essential term in the social compact which defines the rights of the individual and
delimits the powers which the state may exercise.") Id. at 19-20. (The Supreme Court
held that hearings must measure up to the essentials of due process and fair treatment, although the hearings do not have to "conform with all requirements of a criminal trial or even of the usual administrative hearing"). Id. at 30.
143. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (the appellant, a twelve-year-old boy, was
convicted of committing an act which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted larceny. During an adjudicatory hearing, the judge acknowledged that the evidence presented might not establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, but rejected the
appellant's contention that the Fourteenth Amendment required such proof. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether proof beyond a reasonable doubt is
among the "essentials of due process and fair treatment" required during the adjudicatory stage. In overturning the decision of the adjudicatory hearing, the Supreme
Court held that "the constitutional safeguard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is as
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the principle that full due process protections are required prior
to all detentions because confinement constitutes punishment,
irrespective of the intent of the law authorizing the confinement.14 4 Cases such as Addington v. Texas 45 and Bell v.
Wolfish, 46 however, set forth preventive jurisprudence which
discards the rule that a civil involuntary confinement requires
147
equal due process as a criminal prosecution.
In Addington, the appellant's mother filed a petition for his
indefinite commitment to a state mental hospital in accordance
with Texas law governing involuntary commitments. 48 The
state trial court instructed the jury to determine whether, based
on clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence, the appellant
was mentally ill and required hospitalization for either his own
welfare and protection, or for the protection of others. 49 The
jury committed the appellant. 5 ° The appellant took his case to
the Texas Court of Appeals, contending that the trial court
should have instructed the jury to use the "beyond a reasonable
doubt standard" to reach its decision. 51 The Texas Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, holding that the beyond a reasonable doubt standard was proper for this case.' 52 The Texas
Supreme Court reversed and held the clear and convincing stan53
dard to apply.'
The case was appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, which
granted certiorari.54 The Supreme Court affirmed the Texas Supreme Court's decision and rejected the use of the beyond a
reasonable doubt standard for civil confinements, stating,
"[t]here are significant reasons why different standards of proof
are called for in civil commitment proceedings as opposed to
criminal prosecutions. In a civil commitment state power is not
exercised in a punitive sense... a civil commitment proceeding
can in no sense be equated to a criminal prosecution.' 1 55 The
much required during the adjudicatory stage of a delinquency proceeding as are
those constitutional safeguards applied in Gault"). Id. at 368.
144. Richards, supra note 129, at 332 (citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 365).
145. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 431-32 (1979).
146. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 534 (1979).
147. Richards, supra note 129, at 352.
148. Addington, 441 U.S. at 420.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 421.
151. Addington v. State, 546 S.W.2d 105, 106 (Tex. Ct. App. 1977).
152. Id.
153. State v. Addington, 558 S.W.2d 569 (Tex. 1979).
154. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979).
155. Id. at 428.
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Court also discussed the history of the beyond a reasonable
doubt standard, recognizing that the standard has been reserved
for criminal cases, that this "unique standard of proof" is regarded as "'the moral force of the criminal law,"' and that "we
should hesitate
to apply it too broadly or casually in non-crimi156
cases.
nal
The U.S. Supreme Court again rejected the Gault and
Winship rule in Bell v. Wolfish.1 57 Bell was a class action suit
brought by inmates in a federal district court, who challenged
the conditions of their confinement at the Metropolitan Correction Center, a federally operated short-term custodial facility
158 The
that was designed to primarily house pretrial detainees.
59
inmates were not objecting to confinement itself.
Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals agreed that
it is constitutionally impermissible to subject pretrial detainees
to the same conditions as that of convicted criminals. 6 ° The Supreme Court granted certiorarito determine whether the conditions the detainees were subjected to amounted to
punishment. 161 Finding that the conditions did not amount to
punishment, the Court overturned the holdings of the lower
courts. The Supreme Court stated that not all detentions are
punishments, and that once the government has detained a person pending trial, it is "entitled to employ devices that are calculated to effectuate this detention. ' 162 Thus, "the government
may detain [an individual] to ensure his presence at trial and
may subject him to the restrictions and conditions of the detention facility so long as those conditions and restrictions do
not amount to punishment, or otherwise violate the
Constitution. "163
Both Bell v. Wolfish and Addington v. Texas stand for the
principle that a civil involuntary confinement does not require
the same due process as a criminal prosecution. 164 Taken together, these two holdings provide an additional basis for the
156. Id.
157. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 537 (1979).
158. Id. at 523.
159. Id. at 527.
160. Id. at 531-32.
161. Id. at 535.
162. Id. at 537.
163. Id. at 536-37.
164. Id. (holding that, if detention is not found to be punishment, then the individual does not have to be afforded the protections of due process). See In re Martin 188
P.2d. 287 (Cal. Ct. App. 1948). See also Richards, supra note 129 (author points out
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power the MSEHPA grants the public health authority. The
Addington Court focused on the standard of proof required for
a civil commitment. 165 Among other considerations, the Supreme Court reasoned that as long as the civil commitment is
standard of proof
not punitive, the courts may employ a lower166
prosecution.
criminal
a
in
required
than that
The MSEHPA follows these holdings by utilizing a lower standard of proof for a civil commitment. Under the MSEHPA, the
public health authority can isolate or quarantine an individual
without a court order to protect the public during an emergency,
".. . if delay in imposing the isolation and quarantine would
significantly jeopardize the public health authority's ability ' to
67
prevent or limit the transmission of a contagious disease.'
The standard employed under the MSEHPA to determine
whether isolation or quarantine without a court order is necessary is one of reasonable belief that the person is a threat to the
health of the public. This standard is lower than the standard
for a criminal prosecution, but should be permissible under
Addington and according to the court's pattern of allowing preventive laws wider latitude in determining an appropriate standard of proof.
The Bell Court recognized that as long as the conditions of a
pretrial detention do not constitute punishment, the detention is
permissible. 168 Pretrial detention is analogous to isolation or
quarantine during a public health emergency. Pretrial detention
is undertaken to prevent potentially dangerous individuals from
fleeing and possibly causing additional harm to society. Similarly, an individual may be isolated or quarantined during a public health emergency to ensure that he receives treatment and
does not cause harm to society by spreading his disease. Therefore, as long as the conditions of the isolation or quarantine do
not constitute punishment, the confinement is permissible under
Bell.
The isolation or quarantine permitted under the MSEHPA is
an example of the use of a preventive law utilizing habeas
that although Bell is a criminal case, it has "prepared the way for later determinations
that individuals may be detained to protect the public").
165. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 419-420 (1979).
166. Id. at 428.
167. THE MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS Acr § 605(a) (Proposed
Official Draft Dec. 21, 2001), available at http://www.publichealthlaw.net.
168. Bell v. Wolfish, 141 U.S. 520, 537 (1979).
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corpus, rather than a pretrial proceeding 169 as in Bell The
MSEHPA recognizes that quick action is necessary in the case
of a bioterror attack, and this may not allow the public health
authority the time necessary to obtain a court order to confine
an individual to prevent her from spreading a disease. For this
reason, the Act permits isolation or quarantine to be appealed
170
after detention is initiated, not before the detention begins.
This action is permissible because the belief that the government's interest in controlling a communicable 171
disease outweighs
the individual's interest in a right to privacy.
In re Halko directly addresses public health detention. 7 2 In
that case, the court held that under a state's police power, the
public health authority can detain an individual because he is a
threat to public health, without depriving the individual of any
Constitutional rights. 73 In Halko, the petitioner protested the
government's power to ceaselessly detain him due to his pulmonary tuberculosis. The petitioner asserted that he was "continually deprived of his liberty" based
on the health official's
1 74
decision to prolong his quarantine.
The court rejected Halko's claim that the official's action deprived him of a Constitutional right by pointing to the broad
police power granted to a state in order to prevent and combat
disease. 75 The court stated that
[I]t is a well-recognized principle that it is one of the first duties of a state to take all necessary steps for the promotion and
protection of the health and comfort of its inhabitants. The
preservation of public health is universally conceded to be one
of the duties devolving upon the state as a sovereignty, and
whatever reasonably tends to preserve the public health is a
subject upon which
the legislature, within its police power,
1 76
must take action.
169. THE MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS Acr § 605(c) (Proposed
Official Draft Dec. 21, 2001), available at http://www.publichealthlaw.net.
170. Id.
171. Reynolds v. McNichols, 488 F.2d 1378, 1382 (10th Cir. 1973) (where the court
rejected a prostitute's challenge of a Denver public official's authority to order her to
be examined and treated for a sexually transmitted disease without a judicial proceeding, calling the exercise of authority Constitutional).
172. In re Halko, 246 Cal. App. 2d 553 (1996).
173. Id. at 558.
174. Id. at 554.
175. Id. at 555.
176. Id. at 556 (citing Lausen v. Bd. of Supervisors, 214 N.W. 682, 684 (Iowa
1927)).
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The powers granted by the MSEHPA to the public health authority are part of the police powers reserved for the state, as
discussed by the Halko court.177 Section 103 of the Act describes the police powers, which range from planning a response
to a public health emergency, to mechanisms to detain an individual, to ensuring that an affected individual receives treatment
without compromising civil rights, all with the goal of preserving
public health.1 78 In addition, the MSEHPA follows the pattern
of other public health laws that allow for the use of expert decision makers, i.e. the public health authority, rather than judicial
proceedings, to make a great number of decisions about treatment for an individual with a contagious disease that threatens
the public health. Similar to Halko where the public health authority, rather than a court, decided to keep the individual with
a highly contagious disease under quarantine, under the
MSEHPA, the public health authority decides whether or
not an
179
individual should be subject to quarantine or isolation.
2.

Reporting and Disclosing: The Right to Privacy

Critics of the MSEHPA assert that its liberal reporting requirements, which are also permitted by HIPAA, are an invasion on the Constitutional right to privacy. 80 However, modern
court decisions, which are in line with the preventive jurisprudence of their ancestors, support the reporting requirements of
the MSEHPA and HIPAA.
In Whalen v. Roe, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the reporting of patient information to the public health authority. 8 ' In
this case, the pertinent issue was whether a statute that mandated the identification of patients who were taking certain
pharmaceuticals constituted an invasion of the right to privacy. 8 2 In its discussion, the Court recognized the privacy interest of an individual's right to avoid the disclosure of certain
personal information.1 8 3 The appellees argued that the "mere
177. Id.
178. THE MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERs ACT § 103 (Proposed Official Draft Dec. 21, 2001), available at http://www.publichealthlaw.net.
179. Id. at § 103(c).
180. Press Release, Take Action Network, Health Powers Act = Loss of Rights,
Feb. 5, 2002, available at http://www.takeactionnetwork.com.
181. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598 (1977).
182. Id. at 598-99.
183. Id. at 559-600 (where the Court also recognized "the interest in independence in making certain kinds of important decisions" that could be affected by the
Act at issue).

http://lawecommons.luc.edu/annals/vol12/iss1/5

34

2003]

Bruce: Bioterrorism Meets Privacy: An Analysis of the Model State Emerge

Bioterrorism Meets Privacy

existence in readily available form of the information about
patients' use of . . . drugs creates a genuine concern that the
information will become publicly known and that it will adversely affect their reputations. 184
The Court concluded, "disclosures of private medical information to doctors, hospital personnel, to insurance companies,
and the public health agencies are often an essential part of the
modern medical practice even when the disclosure may reflect
unfavorably on the character of the patient." 185 Moreover,
"[r]equiring such disclosures to representatives of the State having responsibility for the health of the community, does not
automatically amount to an impermissible invasion of privacy. ' ' 186 Therefore, the Court recognized that, under certain
circumstances, the responsibility of the state to safeguard the
health of the community
takes precedence over the individual's
187
right to privacy.
More recently, in Baptist Memorial Hosp.-Union County v.
Johnson, the Supreme Court of Mississippi addressed a situation
where a newborn was given to the wrong mother in the hospital
for breast-feeding. 88 The biological parents demanded that the
hospital release all the medical information it had about the
mother who breast-fed their baby in order to detect any 189
potential health threats to the child as a result of the mistake.
The mother who mistakenly breast-fed the baby agreed to the
release of a limited amount of her medical information, but
asserted her medical privilege of confidentiality in protest of a
more extensive request from the family. 190 The court balanced
two conflicting interests in its decision: the health interest of the
infant who was fed by the wrong person, and the privacy interest
of the woman who mistakenly fed the child.1 91 In balancing the
two interests, the court recognized that it had "recently held that
public policy encouraging and expediting the investigation and
'192
solving of crimes outweighs the privacy rights of individuals,'
and that "the state has a compelling interest in ... seeking out
184. Id. at 600.
185. Id. at 602.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Baptist Memorial Hosp. - Union County v. Johnson, 754 So. 2d 1165, 1166-67
(Miss. 2000).
189. Id. at 1167.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 1168.
192. Id.
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the truth in civil matters [which] especially holds true when the
health and life of another are potentially at stake."' 93
The court further recognized that "[t]he purpose of the [medical] privilege is to allow a patient to seek treatment without fear
of embarrassing disclosure so that he might reveal all of his
symptoms to his physician. ' 194 However, the court concluded
that "the privilege must give way where it conflicts with the sensible administration of the law and policy...,"'9 Additionally,
"where the need for confidentiality is relatively weak and the
need for information in the matter at hand is relatively strong
. access may be the rule."'1 96 The court held that the woman's
identity should be revealed to the child's family under certain
conditions, with specific protections. 97
Both the MSEHPA and HIPAA are in line with this recent
holding. The MSEHPA requires covered entities to report PHI
to the public health authorities in all situations where there
could be a bioterror attack, disease of epidemic proportions, or
highly infectious agents that might cause a significant number of
fatalities, or pose a serious threat of long-term or permanent disability.1 98 This requirement is in accordance with the state's responsibility for the health of the community, as recognized by
the Court in Whalen v. Roe.199 Additionally, certain provisions
of HIPAA allow for these disclosures, without the standard consent requirement.200 HIPAA permits a covered entity to use or
disclose protected heath information if it believes in good faith
that the use or disclosure is necessary to prevent
or lessen an
20
imminent threat to the safety of the public. '
For example, HIPAA allows for the disclosure of PHI in order
to facilitate a public health activity. 20 2 "Public health activity" is
not defined by the MSEHPA; however, considering the expansive definitions of other terms encompassed in the Act, it is
193. Id.
194. Id. at 1170 (quoting State of New Jersey v. John Lee Briley, 251 A.2d 442, 446
(N.J. Sup. Ct. 1969)).
195. Id. (quoting Briley, 251 A.2d at 446).
196. Id. at 1171.
197. Id.
198. THE MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS Acr § 301(Proposed Official Draft December 2001), available at http://www.publichealthlaw.net.
199. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598-600 (1977).
200. 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.506(a)(3) (2002), 164.510(a)(3) (2002), 164.512(a) (2002),
164.512(a) (2002), 164.512(b) (2002), 164.512(f) (2002), 164.512(f)(6) (2002),
164.5120) (2002), 164.512(k) (2002).
201. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(j)(1)(i)(A) (2002).
202. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(b)(1) (2002).
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likely that a great number of activities could be considered to be
public health activities.2 °3 Therefore, covered entities have wide
latitude to release PHI to facilitate a public health activity.
Because the public health authority has a responsibility to maintain the health of the community, such releases of PHI are not
considered an invasion of individual privacy.
As stated in the preamble to the MSEHPA, the Act seeks to
ensure a strong, effective, and timely response to public health
emergencies, without unduly interfering with civil rights and liberties.20 4 This indicates that the balancing of patient privacy
against the threat to public health, similar to that discussed in
Baptist Memorial Hosp.-Union County v. Johnson20 5 (where
the interest in confidentiality was weighed against the need for
information) occurs throughout the MSEHPA. However, when
public health authorities are thrown into action to combat a
bioterror or other attack described under the MSEHPA, it is
likely that there will not be the luxury of time that was afforded
the court in Baptist Memorial. Decisions involving testing, vaccination, and treatment of individuals will have to be made
quickly, which will not allow public health officials an opportunity to seek judicial guidance or to fully balance the competing
interests in the situation. However, because the Act itself balances both interests, the public health authority will be acting in
accordance with the Baptist Memorial court. The extensive
powers granted by the MSEHPA must be available for use by
the public health authority if these powers are required.
203. For example, "public health emergency" broadly defines the MSEHPA as
follows:
An occurrence or imminent threat of an illness or health condition that: (1)
is believed to be caused by any of the following: (i) bioterrorism; (ii) the
appearance of a novel or previously controlled or eradicated infectious agent
or biological toxin; (iii) a natural disaster; (iv) a chemical attack or accidental release; or (v) a nuclear attack or accident; and (2) poses a high
probability of any of the following harms: (i) a large number of deaths in the
affected population; (ii) a large number of serious or long-term disabilities in
the affected population; or (iii) widespread exposure to an infectious or toxic
agent that poses a significant risk of substantial future harm to a large number of people in the affected population.
THE MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS Act § 104 (Proposed Official Draft December 2001), available at http://www.publichealthlaw.net.
204. Id. at THE MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS ACT
PREAMBLE (Proposed Official Draft Dec. 21, 2001), available at http://
www.publichealthlaw.net.
205. Baptist Mem'l Hosp. - Union County v. Johnson, 754 So. 2d 1165, 1168 (Miss.
2000).
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In a true public health emergency, a delay of any time could
cost an individual's life, or contribute to the spread of disease.
It would be impossible to judge situations on a case-by-case
basis during such an emergency. As recognized in the preamble
to the MSEHPA, "the whole people covenants with each citizen,
and each citizen with the whole people, that all shall be
governed by certain law for the 'common good.'" 2 0 6 During a
state of public health emergency, Americans will be in need of a
law that protects the common good, not one that requires extensive interpretation.
3.
(a)

Liability

The Fifth Amendment

The Fifth Amendment prohibits governmental taking of pri20 7
vate property "for public use without just compensation.
This prohibition is applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.20 8 A taking question often arises in the
context of a state's police power, since a taking requires that
governmental power come from another source, such as the
police power.20 9
Within the Fifth Amendment, there is a distinction between
the taking of property and the regulation of property. 210 The
government is not required to pay the same compensation for
the regulation of property as it is for a taking; however, there is
no clear-cut way to determine a taking from a regulation. As a
general guideline, it has been held that if a government regulation denies a landowner all economic use of his land, the regulaand is a taking,
tion is equivalent to a physical appropriation
211
unless the landowner's use was unlawful.
206. THE MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS Acr PREAM(Proposed Official Draft Dec. 21, 2001), available at http://www.publichealth
law.net; see also Jacobson v. Mass., 197 U.S. 11, 26 (1905) (examining whether an
involuntary vaccination violated the petitioner's "inherent right of every freeman to
care for his own body and health in such a way that seems best to him." The Court
held that the mandatory vaccination did not violate the petitioner's rights, as "persons
and property are subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to secure
the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the state. .
207. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
208. Chi. Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 241 (1897).
209. See id. at 255.
210. U.S. CoNsTr. amend. V.
211. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992) (citing Agins v.
Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)); see also Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe
Reg'l Planning Agency, 122 S.Ct. 1465, 1480 (2002).
BLE
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In contrast, if a court finds that the regulation only decreases
the economic value of the property while an economically viable
purpose remains, the government action is not necessarily a taking.2 12 If a taking occurs, the government must either pay the
property owner the reasonable value of the property at of the
time of the taking, or pay the property owner for damages
attributable to the regulation. 13 It is important to note that in
the case of an emergency, courts give more deference to an action taken pursuant to a regulation, and therefore are less likely
to find the governmental action a taking requiring
compensation.2 14
As written, the MSEHPA does not entirely comply with the
Fifth Amendment takings clause.215 Article Five of the
MSEHPA gives the public health authority broad power to take
a wide range of actions concerning facilities (medical and other),
materials, roads, and public areas during a public health emergency. 16 During a public health emergency, the public health
authority may call for the condemnation, decontamination,
lease, transport, maintenance, renovation, or distribution of
materials or facilities as 2is17deemed necessary to respond to the
public health emergency.
Also, the public health authority may take control of a health
care facility for the duration of the emergency and require the
facility to provide services or the use of the facility for another
purpose as may be reasonable and necessary to respond to the
public health emergency. 218 The public health authority may
additionally control the movement of the public to affected areas and may prescribe travel routes, modes of transportation,
212. See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922); Keystone Bituminous
Coal Ass'n. v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 485 (1987).
213. See First Evangelical Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 321
(1987).
214. See United States v. Caltex, Inc., 344 U.S. 149, 162 (1952); see also Miller v.
Schone, 276 U.S. 272 (1928).
215. THE MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS ACT §§ 506,
805(a) (Proposed Official Draft Dec. 21, 2001), available at http://
www.publichealthlaw.net. (The MSEHPA complies with the Fifth Amendment takings clause by allowing states to take private property for a legitimate public use during a public health emergency, so long as the owner is provided fair market value
compensation. However, the MSEHPA allows the state to take private facilities
where the facility endangers public health. Under this circumstance, the state is not
required to compensate the owner of the facility).
216. Id. at § 502(a)-(d).
217. Id. at § 501(b), 502(a).
218. Id. at § 502(b).
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and destinations in connection with the provision of emergency
services.219 Finally, the public health authority may control
health care materials during a public health emergency by distributing, rationing, or establishing access priority to the
materials.220
In accordance with the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment, MSEHPA requires the state to provide just compensation
to the owner of any property that is lawfully taken by the public
health authority for its temporary or permanent use during a
public health emergency.221 The MSEHPA also requires that
"to the extent practicable consistent with the protection of the
public health, prior to the destruction of any property. . .the
public health authority shall institute appropriate civil proceedings against the property to be destroyed in accordance with
existing laws and rules of [the]... State. ' 222 However, during
emergency situations, including a public health emergency, the
Supreme Court has interpreted government action liberally,
223
favoring the action to be a regulation, rather than a taking.
Therefore, it is less likely that during a public health emergency,
government action to control property will be interpreted as a
taking requiring just compensation.
The MSEHPA does not comply with the takings clause insofar
as it does not require the state to compensate a property owner
for "facilities or materials that are closed, evacuated, decontaminated, or destroyed when there is reasonable cause to believe
that they may endanger the public health. ' 224 This is unconstitutional because it allows the state to take property without providing just compensation. This section should be categorized as
the closure, decontamination, evacuation of a facility or materi219. Id. at § 502(d)(1), (2).
220. Id. at § 502(c).
221. Id. at § 805(a).
222. Id. at § 507.
223. See, e.g., Miller v. Schone, 276 U.S 272, 279 (1928) (holding that when a state
is forced to make a decision between the survival of two classes of property in a public
health threat, it does not exceed its constitutional powers by deciding upon the destruction of one class of property in order to save another, which, in the judgment of
the legislature, is of the greatest value to the public); United States v. Caltex, Inc., 344
U.S. 149, 159 (1952) (the Court found that the wartime destruction of private property by the Army to prevent the capture and use of the land by an advancing enemy
was not a reimbursable taking under the Fifth Amendment, as based on the urgency
of the situation and the fact that the enemy would have destroyed the property if the
United States Army did not get to it first").
224. THE MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS ACT § 506
(Proposed Official Draft Dec. 21, 2001), available at http://www.publichealthlaw.net.
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als, or the destruction of a facility or materials. The first group
is likely the regulation of property, therefore not requiring compensation. However, the destruction of a facility or materials is
unquestionably a taking, and therefore the owner must be compensated under the Fifth Amendment. There should be one exception to this rule: where the owner of the destroyed property
has purposefully contaminated the property to spread a communicable disease, he should not be compensated.
(b) Liability for Medical Error
The Supreme Court established the parameters of governmental immunity for certain wrongdoings in Berkovitz v. United
States22 5 In Berkovitz, the Court heard the case of a two-month
old boy who contracted a paralyzing case of polio after being
govby the appropriate
approvedasserted
been
that had
a vaccine
given
that the United
petitioner
agencies.26
The
ernment
States was liable for the boy's injuries under the Federal Tort
Claims Act (hereinafter "FTCA").2 2 7 The petitioner alleged
that agencies of the United States had acted wrongly in the
release of the particular batch of polio vaccine the boy received,
thereby violating federal law and policy regarding the inspection
and approval of polio vaccines.228 The FTCA generally authorizes suits against the United States
for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death
caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his
office or employment, under circumstances where the United
States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in
accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission
occurred. "229
The discretionary exception to the FTCA excludes from statutory liability any claim based on a federal agency or employee's
exercise or performance, or the failure to exercise or perform a
discretionary function or duty.230 The government argued that
the discretionary exception barred all claims arising out of the
regulatory activities of federal agencies. 231 The Court stated,
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.

Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531 (1988).
Id. at 533.
28 U.S.C. § 2674 (2002).
Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 533.
Id. at 535 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (2002)).
Id.
Id. at 538.

Published by LAW eCommons, 2003

41

Annals of Health Law, Vol. 12 [2003], Iss. 1, Art. 5

Annals of Health Law

[Vol. 12

"the discretionary function exception will not apply when a federal statute, regulation, or policy specifically prescribes a course
of action for an employee to follow. ' 232 Properly applied, this
exemption only protects governmental actions if the decision
involved the permissible exercise of policy judgment by the
government worker.233 Therefore, the Court rejected the
government's argument that the discretionary exception precludes governmental liability for any and all acts arising out of
234
the regulatory programs of federal agencies.
The MSEHPA allows the public health authority to direct instate or out-of-state public health workers to respond to a public
health emergency as necessary. 235 The Act provides that neither
the state nor any public officials referred to in the Act shall be
liable for "the death of or any injury to persons, or damage to
property, as a result of complying with or attempting to comply
with this Act or any rule or regulations promulgated pursuant to
this Act... during a state of public health emergency," except in
236
cases of,gross negligence or willful misconduct.
Both the MSEHPA and the FTCA provide for liability for
wrongdoing; however, the FTCA provides for it to a greater degree. Recall that in Berkovitz, the Supreme Court found that
the federal government is shielded from statutory liability under
the discretionary exception of the FTCA if the agent who
caused the injury was acting under his own policy judgment at
the time of the damage.2 3 7 However, as a general rule under the
FTCA, the government may be liable if a worker causes damages while acting within the scope of his office, in accordance
with a government policy, statute, or regulation. 238
Under the MSEHPA, if a worker is acting in accordance with
the Act, including reporting PHI as permitted under HIPAA,
neither the state nor the public health worker will be liable for
any wrongdoing. However, if the injury is attributable to gross
negligence or willful misconduct, then either the state or the
public health worker will be held accountable. Therefore, as
general rule under the FTCA, the government is liable for work232. Id. at 536.
233. Id. at 539.
234. Id. at 538.
235. THE MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS Acr §§ 608(a), (b) (Proposed Official Draft Dec. 21, 2001), available at http://www.publichealthlaw.net.
236. Id. at § 804(a).
237. Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 537.
238. Id. at 535.
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ers who are acting in a statutorily prescribed manner, and it is
free from liability if the worker is acting under his own discretion. In contrast, as a general rule under the MSEHPA, no one
is liable for problems that arise as a result of a worker who
causes damages, but has acted in compliance with the Act; however, either the government or worker will be held accountable
for actions that are found to be of gross negligence or willful
misconduct.
4.

Conclusion

The MSEHPA follows the line of preventive jurisprudence
cases. In accordance with preventive jurisprudence, the
MSEHPA follows the three trademarks of other public health
holdings. First, the Act allows the states to rely on expert decision makers by giving the public health authority the power to
determine whether an individual should be detained without
due process proceedings. 39 Second, the Act utilizes habeas
corpus proceedings, rather than pre-trial hearings, by allowing
an individual to require an order to show cause for his continued
quarantine or isolation to be produced. 240 Finally, the MSEHPA
utilizes a lower standard of proof by allowing the public health
authority to detain an individual without a court order to protect the public during an emergency, when failing to confine the
individual would pose a significant threat to the public's
health.241
The MSEHPA and the HIPAA provisions also follow current
decisions regarding privacy and health records.242 The
MSEHPA, however, does not fully comply with the compensation requirements of the Fifth Amendment. The Act falls short
by failing to require compensation for all takings by the state
during a public health emergency. However, due to the fact
that the courts have liberally interpreted regulatory actions during emergency situations, the MSEHPA may be in line with
these requirements.243
239. THE MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS ACT
§ 605(a)(1) (Proposed Official Draft Dec. 21, 2001), available at http://
www.publichealthlaw.net.
240. Id. at § 605(c)(1).
241. Id. at § 605(a)(1).
242. See, e.g., Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 605 (1977); Baptist Mem'l. Hosp. Union County v. Johnson, 754 So. 2d 1165, 1170 (Miss. 2000).
243. See. e.g., Miller v. Schone, 276 U.S. 272, 279 (1928); United States v. Caltex,
344 U.S. 149, 154 (1952).
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PROVISIONS AND

CONSTITUTIONAL LIBERTIES

Change is abundant and yet often difficult to accept. Terrorists have invaded the United States and shown Americans
that we, too, are vulnerable to different forms of attack. The
MSEHPA is changing the face of the public health system because it enables the governor, the public health authority, and
other officials to utilize and enforce public health laws that have
existed for some time but lacked enforcement power.
Similarly, HIPAA is changing the way Americans look at
their health information. The recent and abundant breaches of
health information privacy have forced Americans to demand
change that will bring back the security of health information.
The constitutional liberties enjoyed by Americans for over 200
years are also changing. Americans can no longer expect to live
in the same society that their ancestors did. Freedom still reigns
in America, but it is a more guarded, reserved freedom.
In the face of terror and the new need to be protected from it,
the government, the public health system, health care workers,
and American citizens must work together to reach an acceptable balance between shelter from terror and the safeguard of
Constitutional liberties. In order for Americans to be adequately protected, the MSEHPA, HIPAA provisions, and Constitutional liberties must all succumb to change. Each area must
yield to allow the others to work effectively, without compromising integrity and purpose.
It has been said, "a bioterrorism policy must find a balance
between compliancy and igniting public fears of a totalitarian
military lock-down and thus becoming self-defeating. ' ' 244 In attempting to strike the delicate balance that provides protection
from a bioterror attack, government must be conscious of the
problems that are particular to such an attack. Bioterror agents
are different from other means of terror warfare, because the
agents continue to replicate after the initial attack, and are
passed from person to person.245
In order to do its job of protecting the public adequately, the
government must continue to be granted wide latitude, like that
the courts have traditionally allowed, to develop strong and effective laws and protocols that will combat bioterrorism. Critics
244. Edward P. Richards, Bioterrorism and the Use of Fear in Public Health, at 4,
available at http:/Ibiotech.law.lsu.edu/blaw/bt/epr-bioterror0l.pdf.
245. Id. at 3.
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of the MSEHPA contend that the legislation appears to be "a
classic case of government overreaction. ' 24 6 In fact, government
overreaction to this situation would be evident through unreasonably expansive power grants that threaten to eliminate, not
merely narrow, Constitutional liberties.
The MSEHPA and the provisions of HIPAA that work with it
are positive changes for America. Although both laws require
the right to due process, the right to privacy, and the ability to
be compensated for other injustices to be limited, the protection
the laws provide during a bioterror attack will far outweigh
these sacrifices. Critics have recognized the narrowing of the
Constitutional liberties by the MSEHPA and HIPAA provisions
and have called for unreasonable reactions to these new protections. The alternatives suggested by critics of the MSEHPA and
HIPAA provisions are equally as restricting to American's Constitutional rights as are the two Acts. For example, opponents
have suggested that Americans put their health at risk to defend
the right to privacy by refusing vaccination.247
The CDC has recognized that the United States is vulnerable
to heretofore unprecedented chemical and bioterror acts. 24 8 It is
this looming threat that has caused uncertainty and brought fear
back into the hearts of many Americans, similar to the fear spoken of by the court in Holmes v. Jennison.24 9 However, this new
fear has developed in a population of Americans who are much
more savvy about their Constitutional rights than those of the
last century. It is this knowledge that is causing Americans to
demand the privacy rule of HIPAA and to rightly challenge the
MSEHPA. However, it is this same knowledge that may end up
causing great harm to the United States during a bioterror
attack. Americans must refocus their concerns to learn about
the new challenges that face lawmakers as they "grapple with
246. Press Release, Libertarian Party, New 'Emergency Health Powers Act' is a
Dangerous Expansion of State Power, Jan. 14, 2002, available at http://www.lp.org/
press/archive.php?function=view&record=559.
247. The Take Action Network, The Emergency Health Powers Act, available at
http://www.takeactionnetwork.com.
248. THE CENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, Biological and
Chemical Terrorism: Strategic Plan for Preparedness and Response, 49 MORBIDITY
AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REPORT 1, Apr. 21, 2000, available at http://
www.bt.cdc.gov/Documents/BTStratPlan.pdf.
249. Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. 540, 574 (1840) (discussing the extensive powers
of the federal government when similar authority in the state government would be
"contradictory").
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the right balance between civil liberties and emergency health
'250
powers in a new age of biological terrorism.
250. Justin Gillis, States Weighing Laws to Fight Bioterrorism, WASH.
19, 2001, http://www.washingtonpost.com.
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